Introduction by Barrett, Amy Coney






Notre Dame Law School, abarrett@nd.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Judges Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by
an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Amy C. Barrett, Introduction, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1147 (2007-2008).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/156
SYMPOSIUM
STARE DECISIS AND NONJUDICIAL ACTORS
INTRODUCTION
Amy Coney Barrett*
In 2006, the South Dakota legislature passed a statute, since
repealed, that rendered all abortion, including first trimester abor-
tion, a crime in the state of South Dakota.1 At a minimum, this statute
reflected South Dakota's judgment that Roe v. Wade was wrongly
decided. What more this statute reflected is unclear. It may have
reflected South Dakota's judgment that Roe was ripe for overruling
and its desire to present the United States Supreme Court with an
opportunity to do it. Or, it may have reflected less South Dakota's
hope for overruling than its belief that Roe, even if affirmed, does not
constrain the states from acting in accordance with their own interpre-
tation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whatever South Dakota's
beliefs, its action throws a spotlight on the complicated relationship
between the Supreme Court and nonjudicial actors. What means can
the states, the Congress, the President, and even private citizens legiti-
mately employ to express disagreement with the Supreme Court? If
nonjudicial actors register such disagreement, how, if at all, should
the Supreme Court take account of it? These are the kinds of ques-
tions with which this Symposium grapples.
This Introduction frames these questions by pausing to reflect
upon the variety of ways in which nonjudicial actors have, over time,
© 2008 Amy Coney Barrett. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
1 See South Dakota Women's Health and Human Life Protection Act, 2006 S.D.
Sess. Laws 171, 171-72 (repealed by referendum Nov. 7, 2006).
2 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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registered their disagreement with decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. Both public officials and private citizens have battled
the Court on any number of occasions since its inception, and they
have employed a diverse range of tactics in doing so. They have
resisted Supreme Court judgments. They have denied the binding
effect of Supreme Court opinions. They have sought to overrule the
Court by statute or constitutional amendment. They have sought
overruling in the Court itself. They have tried to discipline the Court
through jurisdictional limitations or onerous procedural regulation.
And they have pressured the Court by appealing to public opinion.
Some of these means, like constitutional override of a disfavored opin-
ion, are generally consistent with the notion that Supreme Court pre-
cedent is the law of the land. Others, like interfering with the
enforcement of a Supreme Court judgment, represent a head-on chal-
lenge to the Court's authority. In what follows, I will describe some
notable examples of each of these kinds of protest, noting, along the
way, the problems posed by each.
I. RESISTING SUPREME COURT JUDGMENTS
Most dramatic are those situations in which federal or state offi-
cials have either refused to enforce or interfered with the enforce-
ment of Supreme Court judgments. The conventional view is that
whatever obligations public officials may have with respect to Supreme
Court opinions, they must obey Supreme Court judgments.3 That
view, however, has not commanded universal assent. Some academics
have provocatively argued that public officials have the freedom to
disregard Supreme Court judgments that conflict with their own
understanding of what the Constitution requires. 4 There have been a
number of occasions throughout history on which both state and fed-
eral actors have evidenced that same belief.
While state resistance to Supreme Court judgments is virtually
nonexistent today, it occurred with some frequency during the ante-
bellum period. 5 By one count, state governments defied federal court
3 See, e.g., EdwardI A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 123, 146 (1999) (noting that "judgments call for obedience; opinions
do not").
4 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to
Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 222-23 (1994) (defending, on grounds of
departmentalism, the executive's prerogative to refuse to enforce judgments the exec-
utive believes to be unconstitutional).
5 See LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, CONSTITUTING FEDERAL SOVEREIGNTY app. a, at
170-71 (2001). According to Goldstein, official state resistance to federal authority,
including resistance to federal judgments, all but ceased after the Civil War. Id. at 19.
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orders on at least twenty occasions between 1790 and 1859.6 Even
apart from these instances of actual defiance, there were threats of
such defiance. In 1821, in the midst of public outrage over the
Supreme Court's decision in Cohens v. Virginia,7 the Richmond Enquirer
proposed that the Virginia legislature pass a bill imposing heavy penal-
ties upon "'any person who should enforce within the Commonwealth
any judgments of the Supreme Court or any other foreign tribunal
which reviews a judgment of the courts of this Commonwealth." 8
The Enquireds proposal is moderate compared to the Georgia legisla-
ture's authorization of the death penalty for anyone who attempted to
execute the judgment entered in Chisholm v. Georgia.9 While contrary
6 See id. at 20. Goldstein's tally includes both judicial and nonjudicial resistance
and resistance to inferior courts as well as to the Supreme Court. While this Sympo-
sium focuses on nonjudicial resistance to the Supreme Court, one ought not forget
that judicial actors sometimes resist the Supreme Court as well, and, pertinent to the
accompanying discussion, they sometimes do so by disregarding Supreme Court
orders. See, e.g., Tyler v. Magwire, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 253, 281-83 (1873) (describing
the refusal of the Missouri Supreme Court to obey a United States Supreme Court
mandate with which it disagreed); Charles Fried, Impudence, 1992 Sup. CT. Rv. 155,
188-90 (characterizing judge Harry Pregerson of the Ninth Circuit as "impudent" for
staying an execution less than one hour after the Supreme Court had rejected a stay
in the same case).
7 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 351 (1821) (holding that the Supreme Court had
appellate jurisdiction over criminal as well as civil cases from the state courts when
those suits raised a federal question).
8 Charles Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United
States-A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciay Act, 47 AM. L. REv. 1, 18-19
(1913) (quoting the Richmond Enquirer). Another example of threatened defiance is
the Kentucky legislature's reaction to Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823), a
case described in more detail below. See infra notes 106-17 and accompanying text.
There, the Kentucky legislature invited the governor to consider whether to "'call
forth the physical power of the State to resist the execution of the decision of the
Court, or in what manner the mandates of the said Court should be met by disobedi-
ence."' See Warren, supra, at 22-23 (quoting 29 NILES REG. 228, 229 (1825)).
9 2 U.S. (2 Dal].) 419 (1793); see Warren, supra note 8, at 166 (describing the
Georgia statute providing that anyone who executed any process of any federal court
in the case should be "'deemed guilty of felony, and shall suffer death without the
benefit of clergy, by being hanged"' (quoting the Georgia statute)); see also Introduc-
tion to Collected Documents on Chisholm v. Georgia, in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 127, 135-36 (Maeva
Marcus, ed., 1994) (describing both the legislation and the debate about it); An Intem-
perate Resolution of Georgia, AM. MINERVA, Jan. 15, 1794, reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, supra, at
237, 237-38 (reporting on legislation in Georgia responding to Chisholm); Jack Ketch,
CONN. COURANT, Jan. 27, 1794, reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, supra, at 249, 249 (same); Proceed-
ings of the Georgia House of Representatives, AUGUSTA CHRON., Nov. 19, 1793, reprinted in 5
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to our modern sensibilities, disregard of Supreme Court judgments
was viewed by many during this period as a perfectly legitimate way of
fighting the Court.
A particularly colorful example of this kind of protest occurred in
1809, when the State of Pennsylvania actually called out its militia to
stymie the enforcement of a Supreme Court order. While Penn-
sylvania was ultimately forced to acquiesce in the execution of the fed-
eral judgment, the story of its effort to avoid the judgment is one
worth telling.
The case began with the capture of a British ship, the Active, dur-
ing the Revolutionary War. The Active carried four American prison-
ers, including one Gideon Olmstead, a resident of Connecticut.10 On
September 6, 1778, Olmstead and his companions overcame the
Active's master and crew and confined them to the cabin." Two days
later, as Olmstead sailed the ship into New Jersey's Egg Harbor, the
ship was forcibly taken by the captain of an American ship, the Con-
vention, owned by the State of Pennsylvania.1 2 The Convention
escorted the Active into the port of Philadelphia, where Olmstead and
the State of Pennsylvania lodged competing prize claims to the ship in
the Pennsylvania Court of Admiralty.13 Under the law of prize, the
captor of the Active was entitled to the proceeds from the sale of the
ship and its cargo.' 4 The primary question before the court was
whether Olmstead or Pennsylvania should be treated as the captor for
this purpose.15 The Pennsylvania Court of Admiralty resolved this
THE DoCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1789-1800, supra, at 236, 236-37 (same); Governor George Mathews, Address to the
Senators and Representatives of Georgia (Jan. 1, 1794), in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, supra, at 237, 237
(commenting on his support of legislation responding to Chisholm).
10 See Gary D. Rowe, Constitutionalism in the Streets, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 401, 411-12
(2004).
11 See United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 119 (1809).
12 See id.
13 See id. The captain of the Convention and a privateer cruising in concert with
the Convention also lodged claims for the prize. See id. For simplicity's sake, and
because the ensuing court dispute involved only the claims of Olmstead and Penn-
sylvania, I omit these claims from the discussion.
14 See id. at 119, 137.
15 Specifically, Olmstead claimed that he had full control of the Active when the
Convention approached, and that he was thus entitled to all of the proceeds. See id. at
119. Pennsylvania, by contrast, claimed that Olmstead had only partial control of the
ship when it entered Egg Harbor; that the Convention had done the lion's share of the
work in wresting the ship from British control; and that Pennsylvania was conse-
quently entitled to the lion's share of the proceeds. See Rowe, supra note 10, at 412.
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question in favor of Pennsylvania, 16 and Olmstead appealed that deci-
sion to a federal body: the Court of Commissioners of Appeals in Prize
Cases for the United States of America. 17 The court of appeals
reversed the Pennsylvania court,18 and so began a long-running and
heated conflict between state and federal authority.
The Pennsylvania Court of Admiralty refused to enforce the fed-
eral order on the ground that the court of appeals lacked authority to
enter it.19 The federal court of appeals retorted that Pennsylvania
"was bound to pay obedience [to its decree]." 20 Nonetheless, it
refused to institute contempt proceedings "lest consequences might
ensue at this juncture dangerous to the public peace of the United
States."21 The judge of the admiralty court turned over Pennsylvania's
share of the proceeds to David Rittenhouse, the state's treasurer,22
who, like all government officials of the time responsible for disposing
of disputed funds, held the money as his personal property pending a
conclusive resolution of ownership. 23
After several more years and several more legal permutations,
Olmstead took his fight to the newly established federal court for the
district of Pennsylvania. In 1803, Judge Richard Peters decreed that
the original federal judgment was valid and that David Rittenhouse's
two daughters, now the executors of his estate, must turn over the
disputed money to Olmstead.24 Within days, the Pennsylvania Gen-
eral Assembly responded with an act declaringJudge Peters' ruling to
be in violation of the Eleventh Amendment, ordering the Rittenhouse
16 See Rowe, supra note 10, at 414 (noting that Olmstead received one-quarter of
the proceeds, with the remainder going to the Convention).
17 See Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 119. This body appears to have been a commit-
tee of the Continental Congress. See Rowe, supra note 10, at 414.
18 See Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 119.
19 See id. at 120, 123.
20 Id. at 123.
21 Id.
22 See id.
23 He held the funds as his own because under the then applicable law of agency,
he would have been personally liable to Olmstead if a court ultimately awarded Olim-
stead the proceeds. See Rowe, supra note 10, at 431 n.105 (explaining the then gov-
erning law). Rittenhouse would have relinquished the funds to Pennsylvania in
exchange for Pennsylvania's promise to indemnify him if Olmstead later asserted a
rightful claim to the money. See Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 138 (describing a memo-
randum to that effect in Rittenhouse's papers). Because Pennsylvania failed to give
him an adequate bond of indemnity, Rittenhouse, exercising due caution, held onto
the funds. For a detailed explanation of the legal dilemma in which Rittenhouse
(and eventually his executors) found themselves, see Rowe, supra note 10, at 431
n.105.
24 See Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 125-26.
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daughters to pay the funds in question into the state treasury, and
authorizing the governor to take "'any further means and measures
that he may deem necessary"' to protect Pennsylvania's interest.25 It
specifically authorized the governor to prevent the Rittenhouse
daughters from being served with any federal process that might issue
as a result of their disobeying Judge Peters' order.26 Furious, Olim-
stead asked Judge Peters to force the Rittenhouse daughters to com-
ply by issuing a writ of attachment to enforce the judgment, but,
reluctant to "'embroil[ ] the government of the United States and
that of Pennsylvania ... on a question which has rested on my single
opinion,"' Judge Peters declined to do so. 2 7
Thus, at this point, two federal courts-the old court of appeals
in prize cases and the Pennsylvania district court-had hesitated to
enforce their judgments for fear of conflict with Pennsylvania. The
United States Supreme Court did not so hesitate. In 1809, Olmstead
asked the United States Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus
orderingJudge Peters to issue an attachment executing the judgment.
The Supreme Court, directly engaging Pennsylvania, agreed.28 Penn-
sylvania's central legal claim resembles one that Professor Paulsen has
elsewhere defended: it claimed that it need not acquiesce in a federal
court's interpretation of the United States Constitution.29 On the
contrary, Pennsylvania believed itself entitled to its own constitutional
opinion, even if that opinion carried it to the point of interfering with
the execution of a federal judgment. Pennsylvania did temper its
claim with a nod to federal authority; it did not claim a "universal
right . . . to interpose in every case whatever," but only in cases in
which it determined that the Constitution deprived federal courts of
jurisdiction.30 Here, however, Pennsylvania believed that such ajuris-
dictional question was at stake. Pennsylvania maintained that the
Eleventh Amendment deprived Judge Peters ofjurisdiction to enforce
25 Id. at 133 (reprinting the Pennsylvania Act).
26 See id.
27 Id. at 117 (quoting the July 18, 1808 order of Judge Peters).
28 See id. at 141.
29 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MIcH. L. REV.
2706, 2736 (2003) ("[S]tate government officials.., are not bound to submit docilely
to unconstitutional actions of the agencies of the national government. By the logic
of Marbury, they cannot be bound by the erroneous constitutional views of organs of
the national government, but are empowered, even required, to interpret the Consti-
tution directly.").
30 Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 136.
[VOL. 83:31152
INTRODUCTION
the judgment of the Continental Congress' admiralty court of appeals,
and that it could thus treat Judge Peters' judgment as a nullity.3 '
The Supreme Court roundly rejected the notion that Penn-
sylvania possessed the independent authority to determine what the
Eleventh Amendment requires. It held that it alone possessed the
right to determine the bounds of federal jurisdiction, and that recog-
nizing any right on the part of any state to annul a federal judgment
would be to turn the Constitution into a "solemn mockery."32 After
holding that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply, it issued a man-
damus to Judge Peters ordering him to issue the process necessary to
enforce his judgment. 33
Pennsylvania did not take the Supreme Court's decision lying
down. Upon learning of it, the governor of Pennsylvania called out
the militia. His aim was to use whatever means necessary to prevent
the United States from serving the Rittenhouse daughters with pro-
cess. 34 When the federal marshal arrived at the Rittenhouse home, he
was met with a line of bayonets pointed at his chest. After warning
both the militia and their commander, General Michael Bright, that
they could be prosecuted for treason,3 5 the marshal began assembling
a posse comitatus to aid him in execution of his writ.36 The standoff
continued for roughly three weeks, causing much agitation in the city
of Philadelphia, and attracting the attention of (but little support
from) the other states. 37 In large part because the Rittenhouse daugh-
31 Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment argument was grounded in its belief that
suing Rittenhouse was the equivalent of suing the state, because it was Pennsylvania,
not Rittenhouse, who had the real stake in the funds. See id. at 138-41.
32 Id. at 136.
33 See id. at 141. The Supreme Court held the Eleventh Amendment inapplicable
because the funds were held by David Rittenhouse in his personal capacity rather
than by the State of Pennsylvania. See id. at 139.
34 See Rowe, supra note 10, at 424. Rowe describes this conflict as the first clash
between federal and state forces in the nation's history. See id.
35 See Letter from Michael Bright to Governor Simon Snyder (Mar. 25, 1809), in
MESSAGE OF THE GOvERNOR TOGETHER WITH DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE CASE OF
GIDEON OLMSTEAD AND OTHERS, 1809, at 5, 5 (Benjamin Grimler ed., 1809) [hereinaf-
ter OLMSTEAD CASE DOCUMENTS] (informing the governor that "[o] ur situation is deli-
cate-The Marshal has noted our men, with a determination to have them indicted
for high treason, as well as myself.").
36 See Letter from Michael Bright to Governor Simon Snyder (Mar. 31, 1809), in
OLMSTEAD CASE DOCUMENTS, supra note 35, at 6, 6 ("I have just learned from good
authority, that the Marshal is serving summons on the citizens of this state, for the
purpose of raising a posse to assist him in the execution of the duties of his
office ....").
37 General Bright, the commander of the militia dispatched to the Rittenhouse
home, informed the secretary of the commonwealth that the situation was causing
2008] 1153
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ters grew tired of being under virtual house arrest, the conflict finally
came to an end, and a somewhat comic one at that. A stepson of one
of the women tipped off the federal marshal to a way in which he
could gain access to an unguarded back door, and "disguised in a new
set of clothes and a hat, [the marshal] climbed through the backyards
and alleyways" to enter the home through the back door at six in the
morning to fulfill his duty.38 Defeated, the governor withdrew the
militia and paid Olmstead with the funds that it had, in the interim,
extracted from the Rittenhouse daughters.3 9 The general who led the
Pennsylvania militia was convicted of obstructing the service of federal
process. 40
The Olmstead affair serves as an example of a state's claiming the
right to resist a Supreme Court judgment. The states are not alone in
making this claim. Two Presidents have openly asserted the right to
resist Supreme Court judgments: Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lin-
coln. Their claims in this regard resonate through all debates about
executive obligation (or lack thereof) to the Court. Interestingly,
these assertions occurred during roughly the same period as the rash
of state resistance to Supreme Court judgments-the antebellum
period, and, in Lincoln's case, the very start of the Civil War.
Jackson's confrontation with the Court stemmed from the
Court's holding unconstitutional a Georgia statute that, among other
things, permitted whites to live among Indians only if they got a
license to do so and swore an oath of loyalty to the State of Georgia. 41
Samuel Worcester was convicted for his refusal to do either; the
Supreme Court, holding the statute unconstitutional, overturned his
conviction and ordered Georgia to release the prisoner. 42 Georgia
.much alarm in the city." Rowe, supra note 10, at 429 (quoting Letter from Michael
Bright to Nathaniel B. Boileau (Mar. 25, 1809), in 4 PENNSLVALiA ARCHIVES 9th ser.
2773, 2773 (Gertrude MacKinney ed., 1931)); see also id. at 427-28 (describing the
lack of support from around the country, and even within large segments of Penn-
sylvania, for Pennsylvania's position in the controversy).
38 See id. at 432 ("The clever disguise of a marshal, not to mention the fatigue of
two elderly women, thus resolved a major constitutional dispute.").
39 See id. at 433. Despite the Rittenhouse daughters' reluctance to relinquish the
funds without adequate assurance of indemnification from Pennsylvania, the Penn-
sylvania General Assembly had passed a statute that gave them little choice but to turn
them over. See id.
40 See id. at 427, 430. President Madison pardoned him a week later. See id. at
427.
41 See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 577-78 (1832).
42 See id. at 597 ("[iHt is further ordered and adjudged, that the said judgment of
the said superior court be, and hereby is reversed and annulled .. .and that all pro-
ceedings on the said indictment do for ever surcease; and that the said Samuel A.
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refused. 43 With a federal judgment at stake, one might have expected
Jackson to force Georgia's compliance, but he did not. Instead, tradi-
tion has it thatJackson proclaimed, 'John Marshall has made his deci-
sion, now let him enforce it."4 4 Jackson's failure to intervene,
combined with rhetoric decrying the Supreme Court and defending
Georgia, leftJackson vulnerable to the charge that he had violated the
Constitution by failing to enforce the Court's decree. 45 Jackson was
saved from a direct collision with the Court by the fact that he
appeared to lack the authority to act. Timing and a procedural quirk
had prevented the Supreme Court from dispatching the federal mar-
shal to execute the judgment, and a federal statute authorized the
President to intervene only if the marshal failed.46 Thus, notwith-
standing Jackson's fairly open approval of Georgia's defiance and his
expressed willingness to defy the Court himself, he came only to the
brink of refusing to enforce a federal judgment. His conduct none-
theless stands as an important, if symbolic, denial of an unqualified
executive obligation to execute Supreme Court judgments.
In contrast to Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln's stand against
the binding effect of a Supreme Court judgment was more than rhe-
torical. Lincoln is the only President who has actually refused to
enforce an order of the Court.47 Lincoln suspended the writ of
habeas corpus during the Civil War because he believed public safety
required it.4 8 Union troops took a large number of suspected seces-
sionists into custody after they were attacked by a mob in Baltimore,
Worcester be, and hereby is henceforth dismissed therefrom, and that he go thereof
quit without day (sic]. And that a special mandate do go from this court, to the said
superior court, to carry this judgment into execution.").
43 See GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, ANDREWJACKSON AND THE CONSTITUTION 49 (2007).
Georgia's refusal, of course, makes this case double as an example of state resistance
to a Supreme Courtjudgment. For another example of Georgia's refusing to execute
a writ from the Supreme Court at about the same time, see Warren, supra note 8, at
167-68 (describing Georgia's execution of a Cherokee Indian in defiance of a
Supreme Court writ).
44 MAGLIOCCA, supra note 43, at 49. This quote, while often repeated, may be
apocryphal. See id.
45 See id. at 48-50.
46 Id. at 49-50; seeJudiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-86 (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000)).
47 See Frank Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 905, 926
(1989) ("President Lincoln once [ignored an order of the Court] ... but no other
President has followed suit.").
48 Specifically, Lincoln authorized Union officers to suspend the writ if Union
troops encountered resistance during a march from Philadelphia and Washington.
See Paulsen, supra note 4, at 278. He did so with an eye toward Baltimore, which lies
between these two cities and was known to be a "hotbed of secessionist activity." Id.
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and one of them, John Merryman, petitioned Chief Justice Roger
Taney for a writ of habeas corpus.49 Taney held Lincoln's suspension
of the writ unconstitutional and ordered Merryman freed. 50 Lincoln
did not comply.51 In a speech to Congress shortly after Taney's opin-
ion was issued, he reiterated his view that his suspension of the writ
was constitutional, thereby clearly implying that his own constitutional
judgmentjustified his disregard of Taney's order.52 The day after Lin-
coln's speech to Congress, his Attorney General issued an opinion
making that claim explicit.53
Historically, the force of a federal judgment has been an occa-
sional flashpoint between the Supreme Court and the states and
between the Supreme Court and the President, but not between the
Supreme Court and Congress. That may be changing. Over the last
several years, Congress has begun exploring whether it has the power
to thwart the execution of federal judgments it deems erroneous by
refusing to fund their execution. 54 These measures are a new
instance of the same basic claim that animated Lincoln, Jackson, and
antebellum Pennsylvania: the claim to the authority to nullify federal
49 ExparteMerryman, 17 F. Cas. 144,147-48 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). Pro-
fessor Paulsen observes that Merryman was "a lieutenant in a secessionist cavalry unit
that had burned bridges and ripped down telegraph wires to try to prevent a Massa-
chusetts regiment from passing through Maryland." Paulsen, supra note 4, at 278.
50 See Paulsen, supra note 4, at 278.
51 See id. at 279 n.225 ("After a seven-week stay in Fort McHenry, Merryman was
indicted by a federal grand jury in Maryland, transferred to civil jurisdiction, released
on bail, and never brought to trial. The Union did release him much later.").
52 See Abraham Lincoln, Special Session Message (July 4, 1861), in 7 A COMPILA-
TION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 3221, 3226
(James D. Richardson ed., 1897).
53 See Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 Op. Att'y Gen.
74, 85 (1861).
54 See generallyJennifer Mason McAward, Congress' Power to Block Enforcement of Fed-
eral Court Orders, 93 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 60-63), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract997879 (considering the constitutionality and propriety
of such attempts). Thus far, these appropriations measures have targeted judgments
from the inferior federal courts. For example, the House of Representatives recently
proposed defunding the enforcement of the Ninth Circuit's judgment in Newdow v.
U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 2002), (holding unconstitutional the refer-
ence to God in the Pledge of Allegiance), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004), and the Eleventh Circuit's judgment
in Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding unconstitutional




judgments resting on contested constitutional interpretations. 55
These measures also underscore that, despite its relatively infrequent
assertion in the sweep of history, the claim to this authority has more
than theoretical importance.
II. RESISTING SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
Edward Hartnett has reminded us that there is a distinction
between the Supreme Court's judgments and its opinions. 56 While
the force of federal judgments is rarely challenged, the force of
Supreme Court opinions is a matter of considerable controversy.
Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court itself has taken the position that
its opinions are the law of the land.5 7 Predictably, public officials have
challenged that position. Many of these instances are well known, as
the debate about the force of Supreme Court opinions is well trav-
eled. 58 Nonetheless, it is worth briefly calling at least a few of them to
mind.
The impetus for this Symposium is South Dakota's passage of leg-
islation inconsistent with the Supreme Court's abortion jurispru-
dence. If South Dakota's action represents a state challenge to the
Court's authority to bind it, that challenge is one with historical ante-
cedents. As is the case with resistance to Supreme Court judgments,
however, those antecedents are truly historical. During the antebel-
lum period, the states defied the authority of federal court interpreta-
tions of law on at least thirty-two occasions.59 During the twentieth
55 Cf McAward, supra note 54 (manuscript at 9) (noting that Representative Hos-
tettler defended such measures on the ground that "Congress is obligated and
empowered to correct the federal courts' constitutional errors").
56 See Hartnett, supra note 3, at 126.
57 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (asserting that "the interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the
supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on
the States 'any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding"').
58 For just a few of the many articles debating this question, see, for example,
Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110
HARv. L. REv. 1359 (1997); Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A
Response to Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347 (1994); Hartnett, supra note 3; Edwin
Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REv. 979 (1987); Burt Neuborne, The
Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent, 61 TUL. L. Rzv. 991 (1987); Paulsen, supra
note 4.
59 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 20. One example stems from the Supreme
Court's decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). After that
case was decided, the Ohio legislature passed resolutions refusing to be bound by the
opinion and reasserting its agreement with the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798-1799.
See Warren, supra note 8, at 16. Another is the controversy surrounding Ableman v.
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and twenty-first centuries, by contrast, such blatant defiance (as
opposed to subtle subversion) has been relatively rare. 60 The most
vivid modern example of blatant defiance is that of Governor Faubus
calling out the Arkansas National Guard to prevent the desegregation
demanded by Brown v. Board of Education.61 Since the aftermath of
Brown, states have not launched any real challenge to the Court's
interpretive supremacy.62 To the extent that South Dakota is firing a
shot over the federal-state divide, it is reopening a political debate
about federal judicial supremacy that has been basically dormant
since the southern showdowns over desegregation.
The President is the nonjudicial actor who has most frequently
and consistently asserted the power to disagree with the Supreme
Court in matters of constitutional interpretation. There are several
Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859). The Wisconsin Supreme Court granted habeas
corpus to a newspaper editor convicted in federal court of violating the Fugitive Slave
Act on the ground that the Act was unconstitutional, see id. at 508, and the United
States Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that the Wisconsin Supreme
Court lacked jurisdiction to issue the writ and that, in any event, it was wrong about
the constitutionality of the Act, see id. at 525-26. The Wisconsin legislature adopted a
declaration refusing to accept the Supreme Court's opinion in either respect. See
Wisconsin Defies Federal Courts, in STATE DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL RELATIONS 303,
303-05 (Herman V. Ames ed., DeCapo Press 1970).
60 Even when states do not openly deny the binding effect of Supreme Court
opinions, they sometimes indirectly do so by failing to comply fully with them. See,
e.g., Norman Lefstein et al., In Search of Juvenile Justice and Its Implementation, in THE
IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 175, 175-85 (Theodore L. Becker & Malcolm
M. Feeley eds., 2d ed. 1973) (presenting data revealing spotty state compliance with
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34-41 (1967), which held that juveniles have a right to counsel
in delinquency hearings); cf. Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 318-21 (1958) (asserting
that states cannot use procedural devices to avoid vindicating the assertion of federal
rights).
61 349 U.S. 294 (1955); see Cooper, 358 U.S. at 8-15 (1958) (describing the stand-
off). Governor Faubus defied both the Supreme Court's opinion in Brown and the
district court order implementing it. Although two aspects of federal authority were
at stake, Governor Faubus focused primarily on the claim that Brown did not bind
him, and that was the claim to which the Court gave most attention in Cooper. See id.
at 16-20. Governor Faubus was not alone in his opposition to Brown; the decision
prompted massive resistance from the southern states. See MICHAELJ. KLARMAN, FROM
JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 394-421 (2004). Albert P. Blaustein and Clarence C. Fer-
guson, Jr. have observed that until Brown, the debates about interposition and nullifi-
cation had been "[v]irtually dormant for more than eighty years." Albert P. Blaustein
& Clarence C. Ferguson, Jr., Avoidance, Evasion, and Delay, in THE IMPACT OF SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS, supra note 60, at 100, 102.
62 Cf Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Standards
State Judges Should Use to Ascertain Federal Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1143, 1143
(1999) ("Virtually all state courts agree that they are bound by U.S. Supreme Court
decisions interpreting federal law.").
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oft-recounted examples of presidential refusal to follow the Court.
Once again, Abraham Lincoln and AndrewJackson loom large in the
debate. Abraham Lincoln famously denied the binding effect of the
Court's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford.63 AndrewJackson vetoed, on
constitutional grounds, legislation to recharter the Bank of the United
States,64 despite the fact that the Supreme Court had already held the
Bank to be constitutional. 65 Neal Devins and Louis Fisher point out
that many other Presidents, including Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton have similarly
claimed the prerogative to disagree with the Court in matters of con-
stitutional interpretation. 66 Indeed, Professor Hartnett claims that
"executive actions premised on disagreement with Supreme Court
opinions are too numerous to count."67
Congress has also acted contrary to Supreme Court opinions,
although it has done so less frequently than the President. Child
labor is probably the best known example of Congress digging in its
heels on a matter of constitutional interpretation. 68 Despite the
Supreme Court's repeated holdings that Congress lacked the author-
ity to regulate child labor, 69 Congress repeatedly regulated child
63 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); seeAbraham Lincoln, From Sixth Lincoln-Doug-
las Debate, Quincy, Illinois (Oct. 13, 1858), in SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS BY
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 184,185 (Vintage Books/Library of Am. ed. 1992) (acknowledging
the binding effect of the Dred Scottjudgment, but denying its status "as a political rule
which shall be binding on the voter .... on the members of Congress or the
President.").
64 Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 576, 581-83 (James D. Rich-
ardson ed., 1899) (explaining that his veto of the Bank rested on his construing the
word "necessary" in Article I more narrowly than the Supreme Court did in McCul-
loch). Of course,Jackson could have vetoed the legislation approving the Bank on any
number of grounds, but he went out of his way to note that he was doing so on the
constitutional ground.
65 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 424 (1819).
66 See Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA.
L. REv. 83, 88-89 (1998) (giving examples).
67 Hartnett, supra note 3, at 154.
68 See, e.g., id. at 151-52 (recounting the story of the battle between the judiciary
and Congress over child labor).
69 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276-77 (1918) (holding unconstitu-
tional Congress' attempt to ban from interstate commerce all products made by man-
ufacturers employing children under the age of fourteen), overruled by United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115-17 (1941); see also Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child
Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 39 (1922) (holding that Congress lacked the power to
impose a ten percent tax on the net income of any manufacturer employing children
under fourteen, as such tax was aimed at eliminating child labor, and Congress lacked
the power to do so).
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labor, until, over twenty years later, the Supreme Court finally acqui-
esced in Congress' interpretation of the Commerce Clause. 70 There
have been occasions on which Congress has attempted to "overrule"
the court legislatively,71 but, in contrast to its contest with the Court
over child labor, it has generally surrendered its position upon the
Court's first rebuff.
As this brief narrative reflects, over time there has been a faint
but fairly consistent chorus of state and federal actors denying that
Supreme Court precedent binds them. There has also been a long-
standing debate about whether such claims are legitimate. 72 It is
worth situating this debate in the context of other means of battling
Supreme Court precedent. The fight against disfavored precedent is
not restricted to head-on challenge; many alternate tools exist. How,
if at all, does the availability of alternate means of attack affect bald
refusals to abide by Supreme Court precedent? Does the existence of
these alternate ways of battling the Court inform the prudence of such
outright challenge, even if the power to levy it exists?
III. CONGRESSIONAL OR CONSTITUTIONAL OVERRULING
Unpopular Supreme Court opinions often elicit proposals to
"overrule" them by legislation or constitutional amendment. 73 It is
often difficult to know what to make of such proposals. They may
reflect the view that the Supreme Court got it wrong. Or they may
reflect the view that the Supreme Court got it right, and thereby
exposed some policy defect in the law itself. Whatever their motiva-
tion, such responses to unpopular Supreme Court opinions are com-
mon, often swift, and have been made since the earliest days of the
Court. They are also, at least insofar as constitutional decisions are
concerned, rarely successful.
70 Darby, 312 U.S. at 116-17.
71 See infra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
72 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
73 The accompanying text discusses legislative responses on the federal level.
Interestingly, states have also attempted to override disfavored Supreme Court opin-
ions by passing state statutes or amending state constitutions. For example, in
response to Huidekoper's Lessee v. Douglass, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 1 (1805), the Penn-
sylvania legislature passed legislation purporting to "overrule" the Court's opinion.
See 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 369 (1926).
Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court has greeted these attempts with even less enthusi-
asm than those made by Congress. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, app. a, at 169
(describing the Supreme Court's rejection of an Ohio constitutional provision pur-
porting to overrule a Supreme Court opinion).
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The story of the Eleventh Amendment, passed in direct response
to the Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm, is well known.7 4 The
successful "overruling" of Chisholm ought not give the impression that
many other Supreme Court decisions have been overridden in similar
fashion. On the contrary, the Eleventh Amendment is one of only five
amendments successfully added to the Constitution in direct response
to a Supreme Court decision. (The others are the Fourteenth
Amendment, 75 the Sixteenth Amendment, 76 the Nineteenth Amend-
ment,77 and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. 78 ) Far more common are
the failed proposals. To name just a few: the Child Labor Amend-
ment79 , the School Prayer Amendment,80 and the Flag Desecration
74 See, e.g., 1 JULIus GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 728 (1974) (describing the reaction to Chisholm).
75 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "All persons born or natu-
ralized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." It superseded Dred Scott, which held that African Americans were not citi-
zens of the United States and enjoyed none of the privileges and immunities of citi-
zenship. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-06 (1857).
76 The Sixteenth Amendment provides: "The Congress shall have power to lay
and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." It was
passed in response to Pollock v. Farmers'Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), which
held that a federal income tax enacted in 1894 violated the Constitution because it
was a direct tax not apportioned as required by Article I, Section 9 of the Constitu-
tion. See id. at 555.
77 The Nineteenth Amendment provides: "The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of sex." It was passed in response to Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875),
which held that suffrage was not a necessary attribute of citizenship and that a state
constitution could thus restrict voting to male citizens. See id. at 170-78.
78 The Twenty-Sixth Amendment provides: "The right of citizens of the United
States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of age." It was passed in response to
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), which held that the federal government did
not have the authority to lower the voting age for state and local elections to eighteen.
See id. at 118 (opinion of Black,J.).
79 See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV.
L. REv. 1457, 1475-76 (2001). The Child Labor Amendment would have permitted
Congress to regulate or forbid the use of child labor. See id. It was proposed in
response to Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), and the Child Labor Tax Case,
259 U.S. 20 (1922), which had struck down previous attempts by Congress to prohibit
interstate shipment in goods made by child labor and to regulate such goods via taxa-
tion. See id. at 39, 44; Hammer, 247 U.S. at 275-77.
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Amendment.81 It is unlikely that the large number of failures reflects
anything about responses to the Supreme Court in particular. The
Constitution is difficult to amend, period.82
Legislation seeking to override or at least circumvent an unpopu-
lar constitutional decision is easier to pass than a constitutional
amendment and has accordingly been passed more frequently. The
Court does not look kindly on such attempts. The Partial-Birth Abor-
tion Ban Act of 2003,83 passed to undermine Stenberg v. Carhart's84
protection of partial-birth abortion, is a rare example of congressional
success in this regard. Despite what some perceived as considerable
tension with the Court's earlier opinion, the Court upheld that legisla-
tion.8 5 The more common response to congressional incursions into
80 See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, In Opposition to the School Prayer Amendment, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 823, 826-27 (1983). The School Prayer Amendment would have ren-
dered illegal any prohibition on voluntary individual or group prayer in public
schools or institutions. See id. It was proposed in response to Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962), and School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963),
which had invalidated state policies requiring daily prayers and Bible readings in pub-
lic schools. See id. at 205; Engel, 370 U.S. at 422-24.
81 See, e.g., George Anastaplo, Constitutionalism and the Good: Explorations, 70 TENN.
L. REv. 737, 834-35 (2003). The Flag Desecration Amendment would have permitted
Congress and the States to forbid the flag's physical desecration. See id. It was pro-
posed in response to Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), which held that flag burn-
ing was protected by the First Amendment. See id. at 399.
82 As of 2001, there had been 11,262 proposals to amend the Constitution. 3
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 1787-2001, at 1600, 1663 (John R.
Vile ed., 2003). This number represents a combination of the Congressional
Research Service's count of proposals to amend the Constitution from 1789-1990 and
James Vile's count of proposed amendments from 1991-2001. The Constitution con-
tains only twenty-seven amendments-or, by some counts, twenty-six. See generally
Sanford Levinson, Authorizing Constitutional Text: On the Purported Twenty-Seventh
Amendment, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 101 (1994) (describing the controversy over the
Twenty-Seventh Amendment's validity).
83 Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201, 1201-08 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531
(Supp. IV 2004)).
84 530 U.S. 914, 945-46 (2000) (holding unconstitutional a Nebraska statute for-
bidding partial-birth abortion); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1643 n.4
(2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The [Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003's]
sponsors left no doubt that their intention was to nullify our ruling in Stenberg.").
85 See Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1639 (majority opinion). The Act did not directly
override Stenberg insofar as it accounted for some of the concerns that the Supreme
Court expressed in that opinion. See id. at 1630-31 (describing the differences
between the Nebraska and the federal statutes). It did, however, severely restrict the
reach of the decision insofar as it honored only the narrowest reading of it. Cf id. at
1652-53 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (complaining that the majority decision is unfaith-




the Court's constitutional case law is rejection. For example, the
Court held unconstitutional the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 (RFRA),8 6 designed to replace outright the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause with Congress' own.8 7 It
held unconstitutional 18 U.S.C. § 3501, the statute designed to super-
sede the Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment in Miranda v.
Arizona.8s And the Flag Protection Act of 1989,89 passed to counteract
the Court's decision in Texas v. Johnson,90 died the very next year with
the Court's review of it in United States v. Eichman.91 As this pattern
suggests, the Court has made perfectly clear its view that it is the ulti-
mate interpreter of the Constitution, but that has not stopped Con-
gress from continuing to test the limits of that claim.
IV. JUDICIAL OVERRULING
It is typically more fruitful for nonjudicial actors to seek overrul-
ing in the Court itself than overruling by constitutional or congres-
sional means.92 Stare decisis is not a hard and fast rule, and the Court
has shown itself willing on any number of occasions to reverse course
entirely in its interpretation of the Constitution. The trick for nonju-
dicial actors is offering the Court an opportunity to do so. Sometimes,
nonjudicial actors can create a test case by putting at issue the con-
86 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000)), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997).
87 In Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Supreme Court held
that the Free Exercise Clause did not bar the application of neutral, generally applica-
ble laws to religious practices. See id. at 885. RFRA, which attempted to restore the
pre-Smith understanding that state actors cannot burden the free exercise of religion
in the absence of a compelling interest, was a "direct response" to this decision. See
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512. The Court held RFRA unconstitutional on the ground that
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not grant Congress the power to define
what the Constitution requires, as opposed to the power to remedy violations of it. See
id. at 519.
88 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000)
(holding that "Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not super-
sede legislatively").
89 Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 700 (2000)).
90 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (holding unconstitutional, on First Amendment
grounds, a Texas statute that prohibited desecrating a flag).
91 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990) (holding that the Flag Protection Act violated the
First Amendment).
92 See Michael Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U. L. REv.
145, 181 (1998) ("Occasionally (judicial interpretations of the Constitution] are over-
ruled by formal Article V methods. More frequently, they are overruled by the course
of events or by subsequent judicial decisions.").
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duct of others. For example, a private citizen might challenge a state's
regime of segregated education, even though the system would be
constitutional according to the Court's then-existing jurisprudence. 93
Other times, nonjudicial actors can create test cases only by them-
selves acting in a way that contradicts the Court's then-existing juris-
prudence. This might be what South Dakota was doing with its
abortion ban: provoking a challenge to its conduct that would give the
Supreme Court an opportunity to retroactively justify it. This means
of testing precedent presents a sticky problem for the government
actor.
Take South Dakota. Assume that the state was perfectly willing to
accept the basic proposition that the Supreme Court's interpretations
of the Constitution are the law of the land. In other words, assume
that South Dakota did not subscribe to Governor Faubus' position
that it could treat its own constitutional interpretation as sound even
in the face of contrary Supreme Court precedent. Itjust believed that
the Supreme Court would have overruled Roe and Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. CaseyP4 if given the chance. But giving
the Supreme Court that chance put South Dakota in a bind. South
Dakota could not elicit an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court
on the viability of Roe. Justiciability requirements mean that the Court
can only act when presented with a live case.95 Creating a live case,
however, required South Dakota to act in a way that contradicted Roe
and Casey. If the Supreme Court is right to characterize its opinions
as the functional equivalent of the Constitution itself-supreme law
that both state and federal actors are bound by oath to uphold-then
South Dakota could only create a test case by deliberately acting
unconstitutionally. 9 6
The above dilemma underscores that even those who support the
Court's interpretive supremacy must confront the question of what it
means to say that Supreme Court opinions "bind." Requiring unwa-
vering obedience would leave many opinions susceptible to change
only by constitutional amendment-an approach at odds with the
93 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
94 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
95 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
96 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (providing that "the Members of the several State
Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of
the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitu-
tion"); cf Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (interpreting the Article VI oath as
requiring state and federal officers to uphold the Court's interpretations of the
Constitution).
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Court's generally flexible approach to constitutional stare decisis.97
At the same time, widespread disobedience would undermine the
ostensibly binding effect of these opinions entirely. Should we seek
middle ground? If so, where is it?
V. COURT PACKING, JURISDICTION STRIPPING, AND
OTHER INDIRECT ATrACKS
With some frequency, nonjudicial actors have registered disagree-
ment with Supreme Court opinions indirectly, by launching an institu-
tional attack on the Court. Jurisdiction-stripping legislation is a
common instance of this kind of attack. When the Supreme Court
hands down a controversial decision, opponents of it often respond
with a proposal to modify the Court's jurisdiction so as to remove
future similar cases from the Court's docket (and, for that matter, all
federal dockets), typically leaving their resolution to the state courts. 98
Jurisdiction-stripping measures have been introduced on any number
of topics, including school prayer, abortion, busing, and affirmative
action.99 Most of the time, these proposals die in Congress. 100 Very
97 Cf Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (asserting that while statutory cases are rarely overruled, stare decisis
ought to be more flexible in cases "involving the Federal Constitution, where correc-
tion through legislative action is practically impossible"), overruled in part by Helvering
v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938), and Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp.,
303 U.S. 376 (1938). Note that the qualified immunity standard already goes a long
way toward insulating many opinions from change, despite the Court's flexible
approach to constitutional stare decisis. That standard deprives government officials
of immunity when they violate "clearly established" law. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 202 (2001) (asserting that an officer loses qualified immunity if the law puts him
on notice that his conduct is "clearly unlawful"). Thus, those who execute the law
cannot test the strength of any "clearly established" law without risking personal
liability.
98 Jurisdiction-stripping proposals have not always left the state courts as the
default adjudicators. Sometimes, states or members of Congress have proposed creat-
ing an alternative tribunal to handle a subject-specific slice of the Court's workload.
For example, in. 1819, in response to McCulloch, Virginia instructed its senators to
propose a constitutional amendment creating a special tribunal for cases addressing
questions of federalism. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, app. a, at 163. In 1871, Ken-
tucky proposed in the Senate a constitutional amendment that would have created a
separate tribunal comprised of one member from each state to decide all constitu-
tional questions. See Warren, supra note 8, at 188.
99 For a description of jurisdiction proposals introduced in Congress over time,
see RicHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 321-22 (5th ed. 2003).
100 SeeJesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Wartime Process: A Dialogue on Congressional
Power to Remove Issues from the Federal Courts, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1244 (2007) (noting
that before the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Congress had only passed two stat-
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occasionally, they do become law-as did the Detainee Treatment Act
of 2005,101 which, in response to the Court's decision in Rasul v.
Bush,10 2 forbids any federal court to hear a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus filed by an enemy combatant held at Guantanamo
Bay. 103
Court opponents do not always set their sights on the Court's
docket. Sometimes they try to move the Court away from objectiona-
ble precedent through personnel changes. Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's court-packing plan is a case in point. Roosevelt, frustrated
by Supreme Court opinions holding unconstitutional various New
Deal initiatives, proposed retirement ages for the Justices, along with
an increase in the number of Justices by the number of those who
would not retire once they reached the specified age. 104 The hope,
obviously, was that Roosevelt appointees would review sympathetically
legislation he favored. Modern confirmation struggles spring from
the same well insofar as partisans on all sides desire to control
Supreme Court precedent by controlling its personnel. 10 5
The states lack direct control of the Court's jurisdiction and com-
position. But they can exert their influence over those who do. In
response to the 1823 case Green v. Biddle,10 6 which held unconstitu-
utes, one during the Reconstruction period and the other during the New Deal,
clearly removing cases from the jurisdiction of the federal courts).
101 Pub. L. No. 109-48, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 (codified at 10 U.S.C.A. § 801
note, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241, and 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000dd to 2000dd-1 (West Supp. 2007)).
102 542 U.S. 466, 483 (2004) (holding that the federal habeas statute gave the
district court jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions filed by aliens held at Guantanamo
Bay).
103 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1005 (e) (1), 119 Stat. at 2742 (codified at 28
U.S.C.A. § 2241).
104 WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN 133-34 (1995)
(describing the court-packing plan); cf. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, app. a, at 165
(describing a proposal to make federal judges removeable upon the request of both
houses of Congress and presidential consent); Warren, supra note 8, at 165 (describ-
ing an 1832 proposal to amend the Constitution to limit the term of office of federal
judges). Barry Friedman points out that one of the more dramatic efforts to control
judicial personnel was the impeachment of Federalist judges by the Republican Con-
gress. See Barry Friedman, "Things Forgotten" in the Debate over Judicial Independence, 14
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 737, 740-41 (1998) (describing the impeachments of Justice
Samuel Chase and Judge John Pickering).
105 Cf Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Back-
lash, 42 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 373, 381 (2007) ("It is well documented that the
Reagan Justice Department self-consciously and successfully used judicial appoint-
ments to alter existing practices of constitutional interpretation.").
106 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
[VOL. 83:31 166
INTRODUCTION
tional Kentucky's "occupying claimant" laws, 10 7 Kentucky tried to
engineer all manner of indirect attack on the Court: court packing,
jurisdiction stripping, and some heavy-handed procedural regulation
for good measure.10 8 After the case was handed down, the Kentucky
legislature sent Congress a formal remonstrance of the Supreme
Court's decision. 10 9 The document contained a lengthy defense of
Kentucky's views on the legal questions at stake as well as a claim that
the primary responsibility for determining the constitutionality of any
piece of legislation lay with the state itself.110 In making this claim,
Kentucky did not altogether deny that the Supreme Court possessed
the power of judicial review. Instead, it argued that the Court's right
to hold any state law unconstitutional was restricted to those instances
in which a state egregiously misjudged the constitutional limits upon its
power.11 To keep the Court so contained, Kentucky asked Congress
to pass a law requiring that state laws be held invalid only upon the
107 Id. at 17. The "occupying claimant" laws were designed to protect the property
rights of those occupying land as against those with competing claims to title. For a
description of the conflict between Kentucky's "occupying claimants" and others with
claims on land within Kentucky, see Paul W. Gates, Tenants of the Log Cabin, 49 Miss.
VALLEY HIST. REV. 3, 4-10 (1962).
108 Biddle was a decision that, according to one Kentucky lawmaker of the time,
"convulsed [Kentucky] to its very centre." 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 28 (1823) (statement
of Sen. Johnson); see also 1823 Ky. Acts 516 (resolving that the Kentucky legislature
"do hereby most solemnly protest, in the name and on behalf of the good people of
Kentucky, against the erroneous, injurious and degrading doctrines of the Supreme
Court of the United States, pronounced at the last session of that Court, in the case of
Green and Biddle").
109 A Remonstrance to the Congress of the United States on the Subject of the
Decision of the Supreme Court of the United States on the Occupying Claimant Laws
of Kentucky, 1824 Ky. Acts 520; see also 42 ANNALS OF CONG. 2514 (1824) (statement of
Rep. Letcher) (communicating the remonstrance to the House); 41 ANNALS OF CONG.
290 (1824) (statement of Sen. Talbot) (communicating the remonstrance to the
Senate).
110 1824 Ky. Acts 526 ("It is the high prerogative of the Legislature, to correct
whatever errors it may commit, within the legitimate sphere of its action. It is only
when it transcends obviously and palpably, the limits assigned by the constitution, to
the exercise of its powers, that the judiciary can vacate its enactions."); see also 42
ANNALS OF CONG. 2531-32 (1824) (statement of Rep. Wickliffe) (defending occupy-
ing claimant laws on the ground that both the Kentucky legislature and the Kentucky
Supreme Court believed the laws constitutional).
111 1824 Ky. Acts 526. In this respect, Kentucky's claims resemble those advanced
by Pennsylvania in Peters. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. Both states
asserted the right to act on their own interpretation of the Constitution, but neither
portrayed that right as unqualified.
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concurrence of at least two-thirds of the Court,112 and that in such
cases, the Justices be required to produce signed, seriatim opinions." 13
In addition, in a move that foreshadowed Roosevelt's court-packing
plan, Kentucky asked Congress "to increase[ ] the number of the
judges, and thereby multiply[ ] the chances of the states, to escape the
like calamities ...by . . .an increased volume of intellect upon all
such questions."11 4 Kentucky's claim that more Justices were needed
to increase the Court's intellectual depth was no more sincere than
Roosevelt's claim that more Justices were needed to disperse the
Court's workload. The Justices that Kentucky proposed adding were
all to come from states with interests similar to Kentucky's. a1 5
Although the Kentucky proposals ultimately failed,"16 they were
debated in both the House and Senate with considerable passion for
several years. 117
112 1824 Ky. Acts 527. Once such legislation was proposed in the Senate, it
extended the supermajority requirement to the invalidation of federal legislation as
well. See 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 28 (1823) (statement of Sen. Johnson) (describing a
proposal that, inter alia, required "a concurrence of at least seven judges in any opin-
ion, which may involve the validity of the laws of the United States, or of the States
respectively"). Kentucky's proposal in this regard was not the only one of its kind.
See, e.g., Warren, supra note 8, at 188 (describing a bill introduced in the House in
January of 1867 that would have required constitutional questions to be heard by a
full bench and decided only upon unanimous consent); id. (describing an 1868 bill
that passed the House that would have required a two-thirds majority to hold invalid
any state law).
113 This portion of Kentucky's proposal was added when it was introduced to the
Senate. See 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 32 (1823) (amending the resolution to require that
in such cases, "the opinions of the judges should be given separately, and recorded").
114 1824 Ky. Acts 527.
115 Kentucky proposed adding three new judicial circuits, each with a newJustice
to match. One circuit was to be composed of Tennessee and Alabama; another of
Mississippi and Louisiana; and one of Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri. 41 ANNALS OF
CONG. 38 (1823) (describing proposal); see also id. at 575-76 (statements of Sens.
Johnson and Talbot) (emphasizing the need for the circuit system to represent the
interests of western states).
116 For a description of the fate of the various bills that grew from this proposal,
see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 187 n.5.
117 The Kentucky legislature's remonstrance was communicated to Congress in
1824. See supra note 109. In 1827, Kentucky lawmakers were still pushing to curb the
Court's power. See, e.g., 3 REG. DEB. 775-76 (1827) (statement of Rep. Wickliffe)
(urging the House to consider, once again, Kentucky's proposal related to the
Supreme Court). Kentucky's anger at the Court was further fueled over this time
period by the Court's decisions in Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825),
and Bank of the United States v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51 (1825), cases under-
mining Kentucky laws that postponed the execution of judgments against debtors.
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One question this Symposium addresses is the degree to which
the Supreme Court ought to take the views of nonjudicial actors into
account.' 18 In that regard, it is worth considering the effect that both
Roosevelt's court-packing plan and Kentucky's post-Biddle proposals
may have had on the Court. Causation is difficult to establish, but
coincidence is easy to observe. Roosevelt's proposed court-packing
plan was followed by the proverbial "switch in time that saved nine."' 19
Similarly, while Kentucky's proposed supermajority requirement was
never adopted by Congress, a version of it was ultimately adopted by
the Court itself.120 Assume arguendo that the Court permitted politi-
cal pressure to shape its behavior in both of these instances. Should it
have done so?
VI. THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION
Nonjudicial actors have also registered disagreement with the
Court by taking it to task in the court of public opinion. Memorably,
when the Supreme Court decided Bush v. Gore,'21 554 law professors
took out a full page ad in the New York Times condemning the deci-
sion.122 More commonly, critiques of Court decisions appear on edi-
torial pages and in news magazines.' 23 They also occur inside the
118 See Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis and the Constitution: Four Questions and Answers,
83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1171, 1219-24 (2008); Kermit Roosevelt III, Polyphonic Stare
Decisis: Listening to Non-Article III Actors, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1303, 1319-31 (2008).
119 Compare LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 104, at 142-44 (depicting a causal connec-
tion between the court-packing plan and the Supreme Court's jurisprudential turn),
with G. Edward White, Cabining the Constitutional History of the New Deal in Time, 94
MICH. L. REv. 1392, 1399-416 (1996) (book review) (questioning Leuchtenburg's
thesis).
120 See City of N.Y. v. Miln, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 120, 122 (1834) ("The practice of this
Court is, not (except in cases of absolute necessity) to deliver any judgment in cases
where constitutional questions are involved, unless four judges concur in the opinion,
thus making the decision that of a majority of the whole court."); see also Warren,
supra note 8, at 165 ("It is evident that the Supreme Court itself took warning by the
character of some of the measures introduced to change its methods.").
121 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
122 Advertisement, 554 Law Professors Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2001, at A7. The
advertisement was placed by the People for the American Way.
123 See, e.g., Editorial, The Court's Troubling Term, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2002, at A22
(criticizing, inter alia, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002), which
upheld a school voucher program against an Establishment Clause challenge); John
Leo, The Supreme's Sophistry, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 14, 2003, at 7 (criticizing,
inter alia, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003), which held unconstitu-
tional a Texas law criminalizing same-sex sodomy); Editorial, A Supreme Court Retreat,
WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1991, at A20 (criticizing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,
310 (1991), which held that the harmless error rule applies to the admission of a
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profession, in the law reviews, casebooks, and classrooms that influ-
ence the opinions of both lawyers-to-be and the professors who teach
them.
Perhaps one of the most interesting forms of public argument
about the Court is one that has emerged relatively recently in the
Court's history: demonstrating before it. Public protests in front of
the Court, at least those of any scale, did not begin in earnest until the
1960s and 70s. 124 Since then, if newspaper coverage is any gauge,
demonstrations before the Court have quickly moved from the excep-
tion to the rule, at least in high-profile cases. 125 For example, in 1987,
hundreds of gay men and women attempted to enter the Supreme
Court building in protest of the Court's decision in Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 126 which upheld the enforcement of a Georgia sodomy law
against homosexuals. 127 In 2002, death penalty opponents protested
the Court's refusal to hold capital punishment unconstitutional with
coerced confession); Editorial, An Outrage, NAT'L REV. ONLINE,June 30, 2006, http://
author.nationalreview.com/?q=MjEMQ==&p=MjAwNg== (follow "An Outrage"
hyperlink under "June 2006") (criticizing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2793
(2006), which, inter alia, held the Geneva Conventions applicable to the trial of an
alien detained at Guantanamo Bay on terrorism-related charges).
124 An early, and perhaps even the earliest, protest at the Court in response to a
Supreme Court opinion occurred on May 29, 1968, when angry demonstrators from
the Poor People's Campaign, representing the interests of Indians, stormed the
Supreme Court in response to a ruling upholding the State of Washington's right to
specify when fishing could take place in the state. See Earl Caldwell, High Court Build-
ingStormed in Demonstration by the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1968, at 1. The first "March
for Life," the still-continuing annual protest against Roe v. Wade, was held on January
22, 1974, the first anniversary of the decision. See LouisJ. Palmer, Jr., March for Life, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES 208, 208 (2002).
125 The popularity of such protests is the fulfillment of the prophecy uttered by
Judge MacKinnon of the D.C. Circuit when the law forbidding them was held partially
unconstitutional: "What would start as two lonely peaceful pickets today would eventu-
ally lead to the hordes of tomorrow, bannering and distributing leaflets ... on abor-
tion, school busing, prayers in public schools, civil fights . . . and a host of other
issues." Grace v. Burger, 665 F.2d 1193, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (MacKinnon, J., dis-
senting), affd in part, vacated in part sub nom. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171
(1986).
126 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see
Lena Williams, 600 in Gay Demonstration Arrested at Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
1987, at B8 ("Hundreds of gay men and women deliberately subjected themselves to
arrest today by attempting to enter the Supreme Court to protest a 1986 decision
upholding enforcement of a Georgia sodomy law against homosexuals.").
127 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189.
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thirty-foot long banners reading "Stop Executions!"' 2 8 The annual
"March for Life" protesting Roe v. Wade has drawn as many as 36,000
abortion foes, and the last three Republican Presidents have partici-
pated in the march either by person or by phone. 129
The Court holds all of these demonstrations at arm's length.
Protesters are permitted to demonstrate on the sidewalk surrounding
the Court, but they face arrest if they cross onto the courthouse
steps. °30 The awkward reception the Court gives demonstrators is
emblematic of the Court's relationship with all of its critics. On the
one hand, the Court, as an impartial dispenser ofjustice, is supposed
to be governed by legal argument rather than political pressure. As
Justice Scalia has argued, "To expect judges to take account of politi-
cal consequences-and to assess the high or low degree of them-is
to ask judges to do precisely what they should not do."1 3 1 On the
other hand, as the late ChiefJustice Rehnquist put it, "[I]f these tides
of public opinion are sufficiently great and sufficiently sustained, they
will very likely have an effect upon the decision of some of the cases
decided within the courthouse."' 32 The Court itself is caught between
128 Arthur Santana, 7 Cleared in Protest at Supreme Court, WASH. PosT, June 29, 2002,
at BI (describing the protest and the subsequent arrest and acquittal of protestors
who climbed the steps of the Court building).
129 See Robin Toner, A Ringing Endorsement from 700 Miles Away, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
22, 2003, at A18 (describing the phone calls made by both Presidents Bush to march-
ers); see also Robin Toner, Reagan Exhorts Foes of Abortion at Capital Rally, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 1986, at D25 (describing President Reagan's live address to the roughly
36,000 participants in the 1986 March for Life). This Part, like this Symposium,
focuses on the effect of Supreme Court decisions already made. It is worth observing,
however, that protestors also convene in front of the Court in an attempt to influence
Supreme Court decisions in the making. See, e.g., Elaine Sciolino, On the Street, More
Arguments Were Heard, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000, at Al (describing the demonstrations
outside the Court while the Court was hearing argument in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000)).
130 Federal law makes it "unlawful to parade, stand, or move in processions or
assemblages in the Supreme Court Building or grounds, or to display in the Building
and grounds a flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice
a party, organization, or movement." 40 U.S.C. § 6135 (Supp. IV 2004). In Grace, the
Supreme Court held that statute unconstitutional as applied to demonstrations on
Supreme Court sidewalks. See Grace, 461 U.S. at 180-84. The Court continues, how-
ever, to apply it to demonstrators who cross over onto the courthouse steps. See id.
131 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 920 (2004) (mem. of Scalia, J.); see
also Grace, 461 U.S. at 183 ("Courts are not subject to lobbying, judges do not enter-
tain visitors in their chambers for the purpose of urging that cases be resolved one
way or another, and they do not and should not respond to parades, picketing or
pressure groups.").
132 William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 751, 768 (1986); cf Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings,
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these two positions. Belief that the latter one is right is what animates
all those who signal their preferences to the Court, whether through
live demonstrations or otherwise.
CONCLUSION
These stories depict just a few examples of the occasions on
which both private citizens and public officials have protested deci-
sions of the Supreme Court. Their choice to act on their disagree-
ment with the Court and the means they choose to express it raise a
host of questions. What are the limits of the Supreme Court's power
to bind nonjudicial actors? Should its judgments be obeyed without
question? Its opinions? Should we frown upon attempts to create test
cases through a sort of "civil disobedience" to Supreme Court opin-
ions? Is it laudable or despicable to launch institutional attacks on the
Court in an attempt to engineer substantive results? Do demonstra-
tions in front of the Court represent a fundamental misconception of
the Court's role in our polity?
These stories do not make clear the answer to any of these ques-
tions, but they do make clear that disagreement with the Court is as
old as the institution itself. Both the longevity of the disagreement
and the occasional vehemence with which it is expressed may be a
sign of vitality rather than dry rot. As Robert Post and Reva Siegel
have observed, "So long as groups continue to argue about the mean-
ing of our common Constitution, so long do they remain committed
to a common constitutional enterprise." 133
Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REv. 155, 212 (2007) (arguing that there are circum-
stances in which "judges legitimately consider public outrage because and to the
extent that consequences matter, and because and to the extent that outrage provides
information about the proper interpretation of the Constitution").
133 Post & Siegel, supra note 105, at 427.
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